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Negotiating Federalism Past
the Zero-Sum Game
By Erin Ryan*

O

pponents of the new Medicaid
expansion decried the move
as a “gross federal overreach,”
invoking familiar tropes about the
bitter contest between state and federal
authority in contexts of jurisdictional
overlap. But regulators in the trenches
of health care law know that the truth
is more nuanced—that the Medicaid program really represents a site of
extensive negotiation between state
and federal actors about the specifics
of each state plan, set within purposefully broad federal boundaries.Those
who opposed the 2009 Stimulus Bill on
federalism grounds similarly discounted
the substantial role of state actors in
negotiating the terms of the federal law.
And those who challenged the Clean
Water Act’s Phase II Stormwater regulations on federalism grounds missed the
pivotal role state and municipal actors
played in negotiating the terms of the
rule—which itself became a forum
for ongoing negotiation between state
and federal regulators about how each
municipality would ultimately comply
within the open-ended permitting
program they designed.
These instances of intergovernmental
bargaining offer a means of understanding the relationship between state and
federal power that differs from the stylized model of zero-sum federalism that
has come to dominate political discourse.
The zero-sum model sees winner-takesall jurisdictional competition between
the federal and state governments
for power, emphasizing sovereign
antagonism within the federal system.
Yet countless real-world examples of
interjurisdictional governance show that
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from portions of Federalism and the Tug of
War Within (Oxford, 2012) and Negotiating
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the boundary between state and federal
authority is really an ongoing project of
negotiation, taking place on levels both
large and small.
Working in a dizzying array of
regulatory contexts, state and federal
actors negotiate over both the allocation
of policymaking authority and the
substantive terms of the mandates that
policymaking will impose. Bargaining
takes place both in policy realms plagued
by legal uncertainty about which side has
the final say, and in realms unsettled by
uncertainty over whose decision should
trump, regardless of legal supremacy.
Reconceptualizing the relationship
between state and federal power as one
heavily mediated by negotiation reveals
just how far federalism practice has
departed from the zero-sum rhetoric.
Better still, it offers hope for moving
beyond the more paralyzing features of
the federalism discourse and toward the
kinds of good governance that Americans of all political stripes hope for.
As I describe in Federalism and the
Tug of War Within (Oxford, 2012),
federalism is the Constitution’s mechanism for dividing regulatory authority
between the national and local levels.At
its most basic, federalism assesses which
kinds of policy questions should be
decided nationally—yielding the same
answer throughout the country—and
which should be decided locally—
enabling different answers in different
states.Accordingly, the basic inquiry in
all federalism controversies is always the
same: Who should get to decide? Is it the
state or federal government that should
make these kinds of policy choices? But
just as important is the meta-question
of who gets to decide that—the political
branches or the judiciary? When federalism issues are debated by Congress in
lawmaking, it is the federal legislature
that decides.When they are adjudicated
in court, the federal judiciary decides.
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But when they become the subject of
appropriate intergovernmental bargaining, state and federal actors in all branches
of government participate valuably in
different elements of decision making.
Indeed, even as federalism scholars
remain mired in debate over questions
about “who should decide” in the
abstract, the regulators who actually
work in contested contexts manage
federalism uncertainty by simply negotiating through it—working directly or
indirectly with their counterparts across
state-federal lines to build consensus
about sharing and dividing authority
as needed to move forward with interjurisdictional governance. In this way,
executive and legislative actors engage in
various forms of state-federal bargaining
subject to different levels of judicial
review, balancing both local and national
input and the distinctive functional
capacities of the three branches.When
they do so through principled processes,
they are negotiating answers to federalism’s core questions in a manner that
vindicates constitutional goals.
State-federal bargaining is thus
endemic in areas of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction or those policy realms
in which both state and federal actors
hold legitimate regulatory interests or
obligations simultaneously. Negotiation
theorists broadly understand bargaining as an iterative process of joint
decision-making—that is to say, any
outcome that is the result of more than
one mind after some back-and-forth
process of communication.This broad
definition encompasses many aspects of
interjurisdictional governance, ranging
from conventional political haggling
(as over the terms of the Stimulus Bill),
formalized methods of collaborative
policymaking (as the Medicaid partnership does within individual state
programs), and even the more remote
signaling processes by which state and
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federal actors share responsibility for
evolving public decision making over
time (as they have, for example, over
medical marijuana enforcement).
Together with the research that
preceded it, Federalism and the Tug
of War Within begins the process of
cataloging the largely uncharted regulatory landscape of state-federal bargaining.
Highlighting categories of conventional
bargaining, negotiations to reallocate
authority, and joint policymaking
bargaining, its taxonomy traces at least
ten different types of opportunities for
intergovernmental bargaining that are
available within various constitutional
and statutory frameworks.
Among the most common varieties
is state-federal bargaining under the
constitutional spending power (see inset).
In spending power bargaining, Congress
uses federal funds to persuade states to
partner with federal policymakers in
implementing collaborative regulatory
programs such as Medicaid, the national
highway system, or the Coastal Zone
Management Act. State actors just as
commonly initiate negotiations with
Congress during federal lawmaking of
special interest to the states, as they did in
lobbying for preferred terms in the 2008
Stimulus. State-federal negotiation is also
an ordinary means of managing enforcement matters in which both sovereigns
have a stake, as is frequent in the many
areas of overlapping state and federal
criminal law.
More sophisticated forms of federalism
bargaining include negotiated federal
rulemaking with state stakeholders, as
was used to create the Clean Water Act’s
Phase II Stormwater Rule. Some federal
statutes explicitly share policy design
with states, such as the No Child Left
Behind and Race to the Top education
laws. Others create staggered programs
of “iterative” shared policymaking, as
does the Clean Air Act’s mechanism
for regulating vehicular emissions.This
program enables each state to choose
between a federal regulatory standard
and a California alternative—creating a
limited dynamic of regulatory competition by which federal policies affect state
choices that in turn eventually impact
evolving federal policies, as states “vote”
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with their proverbial feet about regulatory preferences.
Most subtly, all three branches of
government—even state and federal
courts—engage in processes of iterative
joint decision-making through intersystemic signaling, by which independently
operating state and federal actors trade
influence over the direction of evolving
public policies over time.The dialectic
between state and federal regulatory
preferences regarding medical marijuana
enforcement and immigration law
reflects this indirect form of negotiation,
as have various judicial and legislative
innovations in eminent domain law after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v.
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
The breadth of examples reviewed in
the taxonomy reveals just how deeply
intergovernmental bargaining permeates
American governance, from familiar
spending power examples to subtler
varieties that have previously escaped
scholarly notice as forms of negotiation
at all.
All negotiations take place because
each side has something the other
side wants, and intergovernmental
bargaining is no exception. Negotiators
usually trade on the various aspects of
governing capacity available to each
side, including available financing,
implementation or enforcement
resources, and the relevant expertise
required to accomplish specific
regulatory goals.They will occasionally
bargain for release from inhibiting legal
obligations that each side may hold over
the other. Sometimes they negotiate
over the credit expected for regulatory
successes (and by implication, blame for
regulatory failures). Although federal
negotiators usually possess superior
financial resources and often act in the
powerful shadow of federal supremacy,
federal leverage is often effectively
counterbalanced by the state’s broader
police power authority and superior
capacity for implementation of specific
regulatory tasks. Moreover, interviews
with practicing negotiators confirm that
the normative force of federalism ideals
can itself form important leverage at the
bargaining table, constraining the results
of negotiations in which participants

5

are also motivated by more immediate
substantive interests.
In the end, it should not be surprising that so much federalism-sensitive
governance is accomplished through
negotiation—notwithstanding the zerosum discourse—given the negotiation
features built into the very structure of
American government.The bicameral
nature of the legislature, the presidential
veto, and even the subtle invitation
to iterative policymaking afforded by
judicial review—prompting Congress to
try again to meet constitutional muster
or signaling the concerns that future
legislators must heed—all speak to the
way American governance is, by design,
an iterative process of joint decision
making.The interest-group representation model of democratic governance
itself anticipates how lawmaking will
reflect the results of bargaining between
competing interest groups.
Given the foundational role that
negotiated federalism plays in American
governance, lawyers and judges would
be wise to better understand it: where
and how it happens, what works well and
what does not, and what legal constraints
should apply. Most importantly, we
should understand how procedural tools
available within “federalism bargaining”
can assist the navigation of difficult
federalism terrain that other means of
constitutional interpretation have failed
to clarify. Intergovernmental bargaining
regularly facilitates needed interjurisdictional governance in controversial arenas
where it otherwise falters—for reasons of
political gridlock, regulatory abdication,
or fear of litigation in the face of judicial
uncertainty.Through negotiated consent,
bargainers substitute procedural consensus for substantive consensus about
abstract jurisdictional boundaries.
Yet we can also understand the robust
recourse to regulatory bargaining as
more than a mere de facto response
to interpretive uncertainty on the part
of the Supreme Court or Congress.
Although this argument goes beyond
the scope of this short essay, I close by
highlighting the book’s theory of how
federalism bargaining can itself be a
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Spending Power Bargaining
After Sebelius1

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s
Affordable Care Act (ACA) decision
in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. — (2012),
it is easy to get lost in debate over
the various arguments about how
the commerce and tax powers do
or do not vindicate the individual
mandate. But the most immediately
significant portion of the ruling—and
one with far more significance for
most actual governance—is the part
of the decision limiting the federal
spending power that authorizes
Medicaid. It is the first time the Court
has ever struck down congressional
decision-making on this ground, and
it has important implications for the
way that many state-federal regulatory
partnerships work.
The Spending Clause authorizes
Congress to spend money for the
general welfare. Congress can fund
programs advancing constitutionally
specified federal responsibilities (like
post offices), and it can also fund state
programs regulating beyond specifically delegated federal authority (like
education). Sometimes, Congress
just funds state programs that it likes.
But it can also offer money conditionally—say, to any state willing to adopt
a particular rule or program that
Congress wants. In these examples,
Congress is effectively saying, “here
is some money, but for use only with
this great program we think you
should have” (like health-insuring
poor children).
In this way, the spending power
enables Congress to bargain with
the states for access to policymaking
arenas otherwise beyond its reach. A
lot of interjurisdictional governance
takes place within such “spending
power deals”—addressing matters of
mixed state and federal interest in
An extended version of this essay by Prof.
Ryan first appeared at: http://blog.oup.
com/2012/07/spending-power-bargainingafter-obamacare/, with versions later
cross-posted to ACS Blog and Environmental
Law Profs Blog in early July 2012.
1
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realms from environmental to public
health to national security. Congress
cannot just compel the states to enact
its preferred policies, but spending partnerships are premised on
negotiation rather than compulsion,
because states remain free to reject the
federally proffered deal. (If they do
not like the strings attached, they do
not have to take the money.) In South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987),
the Court famously upheld spending
power bargaining, so long as the
conditions are unambiguous, reasonably related to the federal interest,
promote general welfare, and do not
induce Constitutional violations. No
law has ever run afoul of these broad
limits, which have not since been
revisited—until now.
In challenging the ACA, about half
the states argued that Congress had
overstepped its bounds by effectively
forcing them to accept a significant
expansion of the state-administered
Medicaid program, even though
Congress would fund most of it.
All states participate in the existing
Medicaid program, and many feared
losing that federal funding (now
constituting over 10% of their annual
budgets) if they rejected Congress’s
new terms. Congress had included a
provision in the original law stating
that it could modify the program from
one year to the next, as it had done
nearly fifty times previously. But the
plaintiff states argued that this time
was different because the changes
were much bigger and because they
could not realistically divorce themselves from the programs in which
they had become so entangled.
The Court’s decision set forth
a new rule limiting the scope of
Congress’s spending power in the
context of an ongoing partnership.
Chief Justice Roberts began by
upholding the presumption underlying spending bargaining—that the
states are not coerced because they
can always walk away if they do not
like the terms of the deal. In a choice
rhetorical moment, he offered: “The
States are separate and independent

sovereigns. Sometimes they have to
act like it.”The Medicaid expansion
was accordingly constitutional in
isolation because states that do not
want to participate need not do so.
But then the decision takes a key
turn.What would be unconstitutional,
he explained, would be if Congress
were to penalize states opting out of
the Medicaid expansion by canceling
their existing programs. Given how
dependent states have grown on
federal funds in administering these
entrenched programs, this would
be unfairly coercive. By his analysis,
plaintiffs chose the original program
willingly, but were dragooned into the
expansion. But to make his analysis
work, he had to construe Medicaid
as two separate programs: the current
model and the expansion. Congress
can condition funding for the expansion on acceptance of its terms, but
it may not procure that acceptance
by threatening to defund existing
programs.The upshot: Congress must
allow states to opt out of the expansion while remaining in the current
program.
Justice Ginsburg excoriated this
logic in dissent, arguing that there was
only one program before the Court:
Medicaid. For her, the expansion
simply adds beneficiaries to what
is otherwise the same partnership,
purpose, and means: “a single program
with a constant aim—to enable poor
persons to receive basic health care
when they need it.” She criticized
the Chief Justice for enforcing new
limitations on coercion without clarifying when permissible persuasion
gives way to undue coercion, and she
pointed to myriad ways his inquiry
requires “political judgments that defy
judicial calculation.”
On these points, Justice Ginsburg is
right.The decision offers no limiting
principle for evaluating coercive
offers. “I-know-it-when-I-see-it”
reasoning will not do when assessing the labyrinthine dimensions of
intergovernmental bargaining, but the
decision provides little else. Moreover,
the rule is utterly unworkable. No
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present Congress can bind future
congressional choices, so every
spending power deal is necessarily
limited to its budgetary year. But
now, Congress can never modify
a spending partnership without
potentially creating two tracks—one
for states that like the change and
another for those preferring the
original (and with further modifications, three tracks, ad infinitum).
The decision fails to distinguish
permissible modifications from
new-program amendments, leaving
every bargain improved by experience vulnerable to litigation. And it
is highly dubious for the Court to
assume responsibility for determining
the overall structure of complex
regulatory programs—an enterprise
in which legislative capacity apexes
while judicial capacity hits its nadir.
Nevertheless, the decision exposes
an important problem in spending
power bargaining that warrants
attention: that is, how the analysis
shifts when the states are not opting
in or out of a cooperative federalism
program from scratch but after having
developed substantial infrastructure
around a long-term regulatory
partnership. It is true that the states,
like all of us, sometimes have to make
uncomfortable choices between
two undesirable alternatives, and this
alone should not undermine genuine
consent. But most of us build the
infrastructure of our lives around
agreements that will hopefully last
longer than one fiscal year (lay-offs
notwithstanding). Chief Justice
Roberts’ analysis should provoke
at least a little sympathy for the
occasionally vulnerable position of
states that have seriously invested in
an ongoing federal partnership that
suddenly changes. (Indeed, those
sympathetic to the ACA but frustrated
with No Child Left Behind’s impositions on dissenting states should
consider how to distinguish them.)
It is important to get these
things right, because as I show in
Federalism and the Tug of War
Within (Oxford, 2012), an awful

lot of American governance really is
negotiated between state and federal
actors this way. Federalism champions
often mistakenly assume a zero-sum
model of American federalism that
emphasizes winner-takes-all competition between state and federal actors
for power. But countless real-world
examples show that the boundary
between state and federal authority is really a project of ongoing
negotiation, one that effectively
harnesses the regulatory innovation
and interjurisdictional synergy that
is the hallmark of our federal system.
Understanding state-federal relations
as heavily mediated by negotiation
betrays the growing gap between
the rhetoric and reality of American
federalism—and it offers hope for
moving beyond the paralyzing
features of the zero-sum discourse.
Still, a core feature making the overall
system work is that intergovernmental bargaining must be fairly secured
by genuine consent.
Supplanting appropriately legislative judgment with unworkable
judicial rules does not seem like
the best response, but the political
branches can also do more to address
the problem.To ensure meaningful
consent in long-term spending
bargains, perhaps Congress could
provide disentangling states a phaseout period to ramp down from a
previous partnership without having
to simultaneously ramp up to new
requirements—effectively creating
a COBRA (Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act) policy
for states voluntarily leaving a
state-federal partnership. Surely, this
beats the thicket of confusion the
Court creates in endorsing judicial
declarations of new congressional
programs for the express purpose of
judicial federalism review. But in the
constitutional dialogue between all
three branches in interpreting our
federal system, the Court has at least
prompted a valuable conversation
about taking consent seriously
within ongoing intergovernmental
bargaining.

legitimate way of interpreting federalism,
when federalism interpretation is understood as a way of constraining public
behavior to be consistent with constitutional values.At least when performed
well, some forms of federalism bargaining
provide legitimate means for answering
who gets to decide? by procedurally incorporating not only the consent principles
that legitimize bargaining in general, but
also the fundamental values that should
guide federalism interpretation in any forum.
After all, federalism’s core values—
the good-governance principles that
constitutional federalism is designed to
ensure—are essentially realized through
good governance procedure: (1) the maintenance of checks and balances to protect
individual rights against government
excess; (2) the protection of accountability
and transparency to ensure meaningful
democratic participation; (3) the preference
for process that fosters local innovation,
variation, and competition; and (4) the
cultivation of regulatory space for harnessing the synergy between local and national
capacity for coping with different parts of
interjurisdictional problems. Ensuring that
the bargaining process is faithful to these
values enables negotiators to interpret
federalism directives procedurally when
consensus on the substance is unavailable,
filling interpretive gaps inevitably left by
judicial and legislative mandates.
In a nutshell, the more the bargaining process incorporates legitimizing
procedures founded on genuine mutual
consent and these federalism values,
the more its results warrant deference
when challenged in court on federalism
grounds. Bargained-for results do not
warrant deference if mutual consent is
questionable (for example, if bargainers
cannot freely opt out, cannot be trusted
to understand their own interests, or
cannot be trusted to faithfully represent
their principals), or if the bargaining
process impermissibly contravenes core
federalism values of checks, transparency,
localism, or synergy.At a minimum,
courts adjudicating federalism-based
challenges to the results of intergovernmental bargaining should consider
procedural factors when deciding the
appropriate level of deference to extend.
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similar notice sets forth initial interpretations
of a regulation or policy or sets forth changes
in interpretation or policy, such notice shall be
treated as a guidance document for purposes of
this subparagraph.”
The 2012 statute sought to shut
down FDA’s speedy communication of
“advisory” communications. If it is not
a rule and not a Guidance, then FDA
may not call it advisory or any similar
title. Stepping back to ask,“Who Cares?,”
the persistent device makers now had
blocked FDA’s flexibility to change
rapidly as technology shifts. FDA cannot
communicate the agency’s expectations
in a rule, a guidance, a policy, or an
advisory letter, without jumping through

the expanded hoops of participation.
For some firms, the absence of directives
inhibits their predictions of FDA approval
choices for unconventional product
changes.The prospect of one unexpected
surprise might be enough to startle the
company’s research team and its investors
away from that product direction.
Certainty and lengthy clearance and
comment processes have their advantages
in static and solid industrial regulation.
Technology gatekeeper FDA needs to
have flexibility.The future for medical
device makers may be an uncomfortable
surprise change in FDA expectations, may
appear arbitrary, and may be changing via
enforcement cases, individual warning

letters, or other means. FDA is free to take
advantage of the ancient Chenery case
principle that an agency may choose to
shoot industry “from the hip” by adjudicative means without first formalizing its
intentions.An FDA that must choose
between rapid action and extensive
bureaucratic red tape is likely to employ
more enforcement, more warnings and
detentions, after 2012.The device industry
that won its constraints on advisory letters
may be in for years of buyer’s remorse
from the absence of advance notice of
FDA’s intent.That’s what makes the field
of administrative policymaking so much
fun for lawyers. Learn from the device
lobby:Watch what you pray for!

The Constitutional Limits of Taxing and Spending continued from page 3
expenditures on their federal tax forms
(and self-assess most penalties using
federal forms), it is relatively easier for
taxpayers to discern the federal origin of
such tax provisions.This, in turn, allows
taxpayers to properly target Congress for
blame and praise. Moreover, since federal
tax incentives affect taxpayers directly,
and, unlike states, individual taxpayers
have direct representation in the federal
political system, taxes may be more
politically responsive than grants.The
Supreme Court’s taxing power jurisprudence reflects this notion. For example,
the Court has repeatedly held that the
ballot box, not the courts, represents the

proper avenue for redressing oppressive
federal taxation.

Conclusion

Like the spending power, the taxing
power raises federalism concerns because
federal tax policies may crowd out state
regulation of the same regulatory area.
Opponents of conditional federal grants
argue that by essentially reassigning
legislative competence through contract,
conditional grants reduce the policy
space available to the states and alter the
structural division of government power
described by the Constitution. In this way,
grants are said to redraw the lines of feder-

alism, thereby jeopardizing the benefits
conferred by federalism, including decentralization, policy diversity, and regulatory
competition. Similarly to grants, Congress
uses tax incentives to influence private
taxpayer behavior in ways that may crowd
out state regulation, including—as Sebelius
has shown—in areas that are determined
by a majority of the Supreme Court to
lie outside Congress’s other enumerated
powers. But Chief Justice Roberts’
opinion in Sebelius did not discuss how
to evaluate the impact on federalism of
an expansive interpretation of the taxing
power.This article suggests some factors
relevant to that evaluation.

Negotiating Federalism Past the Zero-Sum Game continued from page 7
Intergovernmental bargaining
is thus a foundational element of
governance within the American
system of dual sovereignty. In the face
of persistent uncertainty about the
boundaries between state and federal
reach, regulatory actors move forward
by substituting procedural consensus
for substantive clarity about the
central federalism inquiry—who gets
to decide?—in individual regulatory
contexts. And when it incorporates the
principles of mutual consent and core
federalism values procedurally, negotiated governance opens possibilities for
filling interpretive gaps in congressional
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legislation and even the Court’s federalism jurisprudence.
This analysis advances both the
regulatory and federalism discourses by
providing better theoretical justification
for the interpretive work that intergovernmental bargaining has long provided,
calling for greater judicial deference
to qualifying examples. It also reveals
legislative and executive opportunities
to engineer legitimizing procedures into
state-federal bargaining at the level of
regulatory design, improving the quality of
federalism bargaining in general. Finally, it
moves beyond the hallowed debate about
the appropriate roles of the Supreme

Court, Congress, and federal executive in
unilaterally protecting federalism to fully
appreciate the critical role that state and
federal actors play in bilaterally implementing constitutional directives. Regulatory
realms characterized by jurisdictional
overlap yield many instances in which
the very process of intergovernmental
bargaining proves more able to preserve
constitutional values than judicial or
legislative decisions alone. Recognizing
how negotiation supplements these more
conventionally understood means of allocating authority provides a new lens for
understanding the uniquely collaborative
process of American governance.
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